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Abstract 
 
The liberalisation of infrastructure sectors through opening up markets as a method 
for increasing the efficiency of infrastructure services is an international tendency. 
Emerging competition has been seen as an essential element in this process. On the 
other hand, the liberalisation of the market for universal services can cause several 
problems in ensuring quality and access to services. In this article we evaluate the 
results of liberalisation in the Estonian postal sector as an infrastructure specific 
sector offering a universal service in a decreasing market in a small country. 
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Introduction 
 
The liberalisation of what are referred to as infrastructure sectors has been one of 
political goals in European Union to build up the common market and economic 
area. On the one hand, the postal sector can be seen as an example of an economic 
activity that needs a specific infrastructure, and on the other hand, the provision of 
postal  services  can  be  viewed  as  a  universal  service  required  to  satisfy  general 
economic interests. For both reasons, specific rules might be necessary. 
 
The aim of this article is to estimate the result of the liberalisation of the postal 
sector in Estonia as a small country. In postal services, due to electronic substitutes, 
we  have  a  decreasing  market  today.  This  is  an  additional  reason  why  private 
companies do not find entry into the postal services market an attractive option. 
 
Theoretical background 
 
Changes to how universal services (US) are delivered can be seen as institutional 
innovations in the economy. The main goals of reforms in infrastructure sectors are: 
1.  To  increase  both  the  static  and  dynamic  efficiency  of  the  infrastructural 
economy. 
2.  To improve the provision of these public social goods which require a specific 
infrastructure. 
 
Economic reforms related to liberalisation of infrastructural sectors pertain to all 
basic  institutions  that  coordinate  economic  activities:  the  state,  the  market  and   294 
organizations
1. The first objective, efficiency, means moving towards more market 
orientation through deregulation, competition and privatisation. This sometimes also 
leads it to organizational changes, such as  vertical or horizontal unbundling. But 
sooner or later the impetus emerges to find new organizational forms for the second 
objective: provision of services in the public interest. Therefore, politicians and 
economists are approaching the problems of common  interest services (including 
economic services) and the special area of universal services. 
 
We can present this reform visually as the search for a new institutional mix in the 
coordination structure (figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Institutional innovations in infrastructure 
STATE
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MARKET
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state, markets, 
companies
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 
A universal service (US) is politically defined and delivered as a common service 
provided for the whole area at a “reasonable” price. In Estonia, the law of consumer 
protection defines the term universal service as any service that is supplied of the 
general interest and used by most of the population of the state or a particular region, 
for  example,  the  supply  of  gas,  electricity,  heating,  water,  canalization,  waste 
management or communication services (RT I 2004, 13, 86)
2. 
 
Universal services are an essential element of the welfare state: its provision should 
completely enable human activity in the area. The liberalisation of these services, 
which  until  now  have  been  offered  through  the  “public  hand”,  requires  an 
adjustment of the rules for maintaining the supply of these services directed to the 
                                                                  
1 This trial division is described in more detail in Homann, Suchanek 2005: 158–339.  
2 Consumer Protection Law of Estonia.   295 
common wealth. A strengthened awareness of costs and profit orientation through 
competition  are  partially  responsible  for  the  inability  to  cover  the  costs  of  the 
sufficient supply of common services. Any supplier who has a monopolistic position 
is obliged to offer a universal service, and cover any losses from the profit of its 
other activities. But if the elements of competition are established, the internal need 
to cover such losses is no longer expected. Without this binding obligation universal 
services can  no  longer  be  guaranteed.  At  the  same  time,  the  obligation  to  offer 
universal services creates a competitive disadvantage for the supplier, and so another 
way  to  finance  the  US  must  be  found.  After  the  liberalisation  of  access  to  the 
market, the public authority has a significant task here to set goals regarding the 
extent to which the US should be maintained, who will act as the provider of the US, 
who will cover the costs, and how will financing the US be guaranteed. 
 
Universal services are partially public goods. These services are well excludable, in 
any particular case, and could also be supplied as private goods. But this solution is 
not  politically  desirable.  To  improve  geographic  and  economic  access  (also 
measured in terms of price) and the quality of universal services public correction 
(adjustment) of these properties is also necessary. This adds a public component to 
these services. Otherwise they would simply be private goods. 
 
Table 1. Components of goods and modalities of universal service 
components  of  universal 
service 
type of good  method of finance 
single service  private  price 
system properties: 
accessibility etc. 
public  grant-in-aid (subsidy) 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 
There  are  two  different  solutions to  ensure  these  properties,  which  are  certainly 
possible to combine: 
1.  To reserve the monopolistic right for a particular operator to offer the service in 
certain regions or market segments. The additional costs of providing the US 
could be covered through cross-subsidizing. The first steps in reforming the 
postal service in most cases involved a monopoly for delivering regular mail 
and parcel-post packages
3. 
2.  To finance additional costs from external resources: here direct payments are 
possible from the public budget, or from a special compensation fund founded 
by competitors in the market
4. 
 
The first option, retaining the right for a monopolistic supply, means a simple and 
stable method of financing. However, the fact that this involves maintaining the 
                                                                  
3  In Estonia, we see currently this solution in bus transportation, as well. There are given 
temporary monopolies for regional areas where is used the cross-subsidizing. 
4 In Estonia, from public budgets is financed directly the passenger transportation but in postal 
and telecommunication services is used the competition for funds.    296 
monopoly means potentially loosing a number of the advantages of the competitive 
system,  such  as  improved  efficiency  and  innovative  solutions  proposed  by 
newcomers. 
 
On the other hand, the abolition of the predetermined monopoly and opening up the 
market can cause financial problems for the US provider because competitors can 
take all the profit by skimming pricing in profitable segments without covering the 
cost of the US. The maintenance of the universal service obligation without a new 
finance  mechanism  seems  financially  impossible.  Therefore,  according  to 
Riechmann et al. (2007: 12-28), in countries that have liberalised their market and 
where a definite operator should finance the universal service, these operators are 
forced  to  facilitate access  (Sweden) or  their  financial balance will  be  threatened 
(United Kingdom). 
 
But we could return to the idea that the operator could cover the costs of USO 
relatively easily by increasing prices, reorienting in a stronger economic direction or 
applying  network  advantages  (using  the  same  network  for  a  number  of  more 
profitable services as well). But these advantages will remain small considering that 
the  competitors  will  also  have  access  to  the  postal  network  under  the  same 
conditions. 
 
Another solution would be to reduce the duties imposed on the supplier of the US. 
This  is  possible,  for  example,  through  price  formation  limits,  reduced  quality 
requirements or the reduction of the number of services. But politicians are often 
interested in retaining existing universal services. Therefore, these options are often 
rejected for political reasons and a list of accompanying measures that the countries 
can adopt to finance the US and to ensure the financial convertibility of its supply on 
the free market are proposed instead. 
 
  Public balance: through direct public grants, or indirect support through the use 
of public arrangements. The arguments against the option of public support state 
that in the long run it will cause continuous pressure on the national budget. 
Besides, the fact that the public support targeted for US will increasingly be used 
through cross-subsidizing for competitive services must also be considered. 
 
  Taxation  of  access  to  the  network:  the  implementation  of  a  tax  that  market 
participants  have  to  pay  to  an  operator  to  use  the  network.  Alternatively, 
participants can decide to offer the entire service themselves. 
 
  Compensation funds: the duty of USO will be financed through taxes collected 
from competitors or directly from clients. The taxes could be collected as a fixed 
amount  or  as  a  percentage  of  earnings  or  from  the  profits  of  participants. 
Compensation  funds  have  been  used  to  finance  USO  in  sectors  such  as 
telecommunications  and  energy.  The  experience  of  compensation  funds  as  a 
finance mechanism for universal postal services is nevertheless restricted. 
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  “Pay or play”: newcomers to the market can choose whether they will serve only 
profitable areas and pay into a compensation fund, or participate in cost-intensive 
areas  as  well  (by  providing  the  universal  service)  without  paying  into  the 
compensation fund. There are two ways of constructing this scheme: a “discrete” 
version,  where  it  is  only  possible for  the  newcomer  to  participate to  the  full 
extent (e.g. provide postal services in every area of the country), and flexible 
version,  where  the  newcomer  can  choose  the  extent  to  which  they  want  to 
provide  the  universal  service,  and  this  will  be  the  basis of  their  payment.  In 
comparison  with  compensation  funds  this  system  is  more  attractive  for 
newcomers willing to compete over cost-intensive services. 
 
No  common  solution  has been introduced  in  Europe,  although each  method  has 
specific  advantages  and  disadvantages  in  terms  of  efficiency,  fair  competition, 
welfare, transparency and feasibility. Similarly, on the grounds of various political 
aims  and  regional  characteristics  no  approach  in  its  purest  form  would  be 
practicable. The greatest problem in applying these instruments is calculating the 
exact cost of USO (Jaag et al. 2008). Therefore, the best solution depends on the 
specific nature of the country or region concerned, and the political aims of the 
government. Therefore, a one-size fits all policy is not realistic. 
 
Postal reform in Europe 
 
Although the changes described above have become increasingly global over time 
(Bares 2009: 5-11), we will now explore developments more specifically within the 
EU,  as  these  reforms  establish  the  background  and  have  a  direct  impact  on  the 
situation in Estonia. 
 
The postal sector is seen as having a growing economic importance and impact on 
other sectors. It accounts for approximately one per cent of GDP per year in the EU 
and employs approximately 1.7 billion people
5. We can see a long -term gradual 
liberalisation in practice and the EU is in the last phase of a 15 -year process of 
opening up the postal service to more competition. Different opinions exist about the 
right time frame for the liberalisation of US while guaranteeing continuity of service 
provision for consumers. It seems that a compromise has been reached in this regard 
but whether this will ultimately work out remains to be seen. 
The first initiative to liberalise the postal sector was initiated at the beginning of the 
1990s within the framework of efforts  to introduce a single market in Europe. The 
aim was: 
  to  open  up  national  monopolies  to  competition,  to  make  the  postal  service 
faster, more convenient, more efficient and innovative, as has taken place in 
telecommunications and energy; 
  to harmonize capabilities; 
  to improve the quality of cross-border services; 
                                                                  
5  http://www.euractiv.com/de/verkehr/liberalisierung-postdienste/article-161559?display= 
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  to react to the growth of electronic alternatives to postal services. This refers to 
the fear that new electronic services could lead to a decline in the postal service. 
However, the volume of postal transmissions has been stable, since 2002. 
 
The first directive for the postal service was adopted in 1997 (97/67/EG) and the 
next directive (2002/39/EG) followed in 2002. The result of these directives has 
been the opening up of a list of postal services to competition, included delivering 
(shipping) packages and express services. However, this was not extended to include 
delivery  services  for  letters  weighing  less  than  20  kg.  Specific  operators  were 
permitted to continue in this “reserved branch”, which constitutes more than 70% of 
the  entire  postal  service  and  obtains  approximately  60%  of  the  earnings  of  the 
sector,  and  to  call  themselves  “the  operator  of  the  universal  postal  service”. 
Countries like France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Belgium, Hungary and Poland (know as 
the “southern group”) were still afraid that such a quick liberalisation could kill the 
public operator and lead to a reduction in service quality and an extensive reduction 
of workplaces
6. 
 
In the third postal services directive (2008/06/EG)
7 European officials and member 
states agreed to manage full liberalisation for all countries by 1 January 2011, or to 
delay until 2013. The delay was applied in the following cases: 
  new member states; 
  states with extraordinary complicated topography or many islands, like Greece; 
  states with small populations and limited geographical size, like Luxemburg; 
  to avoid distortions from competition, the Parliament and Council agreed on the 
introduction of a “mutuality clause” that forbids postal service providers from 
countries with a reserved area to operate in countries where the postal market 
had already been fully opened (EurActiv – 18 June 2007).
8 
 
The final directive intends to offer a list of flanking measures that the member states 
can use to ensure the financial profitability of US on liberalised markets. These 
measures include financial help (e.g. direct public subsidies), cross-subsidizing from 
profitable services, or the creation of a compensation fund through the taxation of 
new suppliers or clients on the market. 
 
The new directive allowed governments to finance US provision costs in whatever 
form is most appropriate for their individual situation, so far as it does not  distort 
fair competition. The commission also permits the use of state support. A claim 
from the parliament involved the addition of a clause that obligated the commission 
to deliver detailed information on how the net costs for the universal service will be 
calculated. In this manner, the legal certainty and equal conditions for all operators 
                                                                  
6 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/post/doc/reports/report_de.pdf 
7 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/post/doc/legislation/2008-06_de.pdf 
8  http://www.euractiv.com/de/verkehr/europaabgeordnete-verschieben-postreform-um-zwei-
jahre/article-164703   299 
could be delivered, avoiding any abuse of competition law. 
9 Furthermore, in 2010 
European regulations for postal services were established. 
10 
 
The results of this p rocess have not been very positive so far. Riechmann  et al. 
describe the liberalisation experience of pioneers, UK and Sweden, as follows: 
The path to competition seems to depend on the convenience or inconvenience of 
the conditions of access to the service infrastructure belonging to the incumbent: 
  where access conditions are ensured, for example in the UK competition for 
access really seems to be functioning. This means competitors offer payments 
in advance, for example, for sorting and initial transportation to retail centres 
and concedes this service to the incumbent; 
  where access conditions are inconvenient, for example in Sweden the supplier 
seems decide on an “end-to-end” solution. This means they undertake services 
back and forward. Mostly they  provide a limited service for the incumbent, 
which means they provide letter post, for example, only twice per week, or only 
service areas partially. 
 
Despite the dominant form of competition, typically only one or two competitors 
emerge  besides the  incumbent.  The  reason  for  this  is the  scale disadvantage  for 
newcomers: even in a large country like Germany one region only allows market 
entry to a small number of suppliers. 
 
Similarly, the federal representative, Dieter Engels, is of the opinion that the real 
competition  in  the  letter  post  market  is  still  to  develop.  The  market  shares  of 
competitors indicate hesitant competitive development in every member state that 
has fully opened to the market. 
 
According to Okholm et al. (2010: 16) the development of competition in 2010 was 
not much better:  
  National postal operators maintain dominance in a number of market segments, 
a  number  of  important  entry  barriers  remain,  and  a  number  of  competition 
issues have been reported. 
  Despite  the  fact  that  full  legal  opening  up  of  the  postal  market  has  been 
achieved  in  Estonia,  Germany,  the  Netherlands,  Sweden,  and  the  United 
Kingdom, actual competition in these countries is still low or undisclosed. 
  Competition tends to be stronger outside the letter post segment, especially in 
express post and parcels, and to a lesser extent in cross-border mail, direct mail, 
and publications. 
  Interviews  with  competitor  postal  operators  and  trade  unions  revealed 
significant entry barriers. These must be overcome before the market can be 
considered truly open. Important barriers include the special VAT treatment of 
“public postal operators”, strict licensing requirements, lack of clarity regarding 
                                                                  
9  for  further  information  about  the  different  methods  of  financing,  look: 
http://www.euractiv.com/de/verkehr/finanzierung-universaldienste-postlieferung/article-
164740?display=normal 
10 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:217:0007:0009:DE:PDF   300 
the latest EU case law, the presence of a reserved area where this is still the 
case, employment regulations, regulations regarding the financing of the USO 
and regulations of access to the postal infrastructure for the NPOs. 
 
According to Okholm et al., the second direction of institutional innovations – the 
USO – is also experiencing problems (2010: 17-18): 
  The definition of USO varies from country to country but seems to be stable 
over time. This may indicate that USO does not evolve in line with the needs of 
today’s consumers. 
  The Third Postal Directive foresees that the reserved area (the traditional source 
of financing for the net cost, if any, of the universal service) will disappear. 
This has sparked discussion about how to estimate the net costs of the USO. 
However, only a few countries have actually estimated the net costs instead of 
the gross costs of the USO.  
  So far, financing the USO does not seem to pose a major challenge in most 
countries. Only a few countries currently find it necessary to compensate the 
USP for the net costs of USO. However, the countries that have implemented 
the  Third  Postal  Directive  have  foreseen  a  compensation  fund  that  can  be 
activated if the USO poses a (significant) net cost to the USP in the future. 
 
Postal reform in Estonia  
 
In April 2009, Estonia officially fully opened its postal market and became the fifth 
country to do so in Europe.
11 This meant first the abolition of all reserved areas.
12 In 
particular, the previous monopoly, Eesti Post (EP), has lost the right to handle 
simple letters (below 50 kg). This reserved area constituted 75% of all letters and 
packages  in 2007.
13  Theoretically, it was also possible to compete with the old 
postal operator at that time, but in reality there existed prohibitive market barriers. 
Since 2009, all postal companies really have the right, according to the postal law, to 
handle simple letters. Consumers and small and medium -sized postal companies 
should benefit the most from the opening up of the market and through these also 
the entire economy. 
 
Two politically defined universal services currently exist in Estonia – letters below 2 
kg and parcel-post packages below 20 kg (not including wholesale mail). One valid 
quality criterion is that 90% of all domestic letters must be delivered the next day. 
The valid geographical access requirement is that every local administrative unit 
should have one postal office  for every 2000 inhabitants. In addition, maximum 
                                                                  
11 Six Member States: Austria, Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Slovenia may 
be considered as countries where the existing laws are to a large extent already harmonized 
with the provisions in the Directive. This is based on the assessment of the respondents to the 
questionnaire. Germany may be in compliance to a large extent, but did not formally adopt any 
new law/amendments explicitly referring to Directive 2008/6/EC. 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/post/doc/studies/2010-main-developments_en.pdf 
12 https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/13091513 
13 http://www.konkurentsiamet.ee/?id=13903   301 
limits for the prices for all universal services are set by the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Communication.
14  
 
A supplementary regulation for universal services took place in 200 8. The single 
participant, and therefore, the winner was EP. But EP is no longer a monopoly and 
was  motivated  to  increase  its  efficiency  through  cost  optimization  and  the 
development of products. However, EP has remained the dominant supplier in the 
postal sector. There are two reasons for this. On the one hand, it provides a broad 
range of services,
15 on the other hand, the  postal network is well-established. By the 
end of 2009, EP had 351 postal offices (in 2008 still 407), 3100 letter boxes, a total 
of 3200 employees, among them more that 2600 working directly in the postal 
service. The share of the US in the total turnover of EP was approximately one third. 
The company operated with a profit in 2009 mainly thanks to activities in logistics 
and the financial sector. In 2010, the overall profit of the company was 7.2 billion 
euros. 
 
In total, there are 33 enterprises currently operating on the Estonian postal market, 
among them only Express Post is functioning as a genuine competitor for EP for 
US.
16 Although EP still had two competitors in 2009, D2D had problems with the 
compensation fund, which it resolved by the end of the year. So, the opening up of 
the market has not resulted in any vitalization of competition in universal postal 
services. Similarly, the total number of market participants outside US has to some 
extent reduced after the initial growth. In 2008 and 2009, there were 39 and 40 
suppliers respectively still active on the Estonian postal market (table 2). So we can 
speak about a selection process, and the first result of our analysis: liberalisation has 
not resulted in any essential competition in US in the postal sector. What could be 
the reasons for that? 
 
Table 2. Number of suppliers on the postal market in Estonia 2008–2009 
Service  2008  2009 
Universal service  1  1 
Letters  2  3 
Packages  0  1 
Express service  38  39 
Advertisement mail outs  6  8 
Press mail outs  2  4 
Other  2  4 
Source: Competition board of Estonia. 
 
                                                                  
14 For example, since 01.01.2011 are for simple letters in Estonia valid the next prices: until 50 
G  0,35,  50-100  G  0,40  and  100-150  G  0,45  Euro.  http://www.post.ee/failid/UPT_kiri_ 
EUR_2011.pdf 
15 The company supplies besides traditional postal services additionally several financial and 
logistic services. 
16 http://mtr.mkm.ee/default.aspx?s=sastatistika   302 
First, turnover on the postal market has experienced a decreasing trend because of 
the growing importance of electronic forms of communication (figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Market development for letters in Estonia (billions of units)  
 
Source: Eesti Post. 
 
In  2008,  turnover  was  still  77  billion  euros  (US  40.1%  express  service  36.1%, 
journal deliveries 12.7%) In 2009, the turnover was 17.6% less at only 63 billion 
euros, including express services 37.3%. The share of US decreased to 26.2%. 
 
The second reason is without doubt the finance model for the additional costs of the 
US. As opposed to other postal services (express services, advertisement- and press 
mail outs) where the obligation to register is all that exists, suppliers competing for 
US have to apply for a license from the competition board. With the license comes 
the obligation, to participate in the US compensation activity,
17 and payments into 
the compensation fund will be set by government.
18 The postal law provides the 
maximum limits: up to 5% of turnover, or a fixed amount for every unit handled. 
For example, the amount for the simple letter cannot exceed 0.19 euros (paragraph 
41 of Estonian postal law). 
 
The competition board is responsible for monitoring the postal market. In Estonia, 
we  have  an  integrated  authority  for  market  control  that  is  at  the  same   time 
responsible both ex post and ex ante control. The supplier of US has the right, once 
every three months, to apply for compensation for the additional costs related to 
delivering the universal postal service from the competition board.
19 
 
                                                                  
17  Every  company  that  has  a  license  to  handle  postal  letters  and  packages,  according  to 
paragraph 10 of the Estonian postal law, is obliged to finance this service. In most cases, 
licensed services are the same as universal services. The only exceptional case that needs the 
license but does not belong to universal service, are the wholesale mail outs. 
18 The regulation from 5th of March 2009 has fixed, for example, for simple letters the payment 
of  0.15  Euro  and  for  other  letters  1.21  Euro.  https://www.riigiteataja.ee/ 
akt/13156387?leiaKehtiv 
19  See  the  regulation  of  the  Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs  and  Communications  from 
06.03.2009 No 21 https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/13156505   303 
In 2009, the additional costs for EP, according to the competition board, were 2.8 
billion of euros. EP’s obligation to pay was a total of 0.1 billion euros less, while 
competitors have paid 0.09 billion euros. This amount was paid back to EP at the 
end of the year, and the difference in comparison with the scheduled value remained 
to be paid in 2010. In parliamentary hearings it  was claimed to the Ministry of 
Economic  Affairs  and  Communications
20  that EP had experienced a loss of 0.8 
billion euros in 2010, although turnover was 53.2 billion euros and total profit 7.2 
billion euros. So we have the second result: the compensation fund in the present 
circumstances is not sustainable, and certainly not efficient. This is firstly due to the 
state of competition on the Estonian postal market, and secondly due to politically 
fixed criteria for quality and access (including affordability). It is impossible for a 
competitor (Express Post) with 10% of the market share to cover the additional costs 
of the US alone. As we will see further on, this single competitor will ultimately also 
exit the market. The following options are put forward as potential solutions: 
  direct grants from the public budget; 
  reduce the access and quality of the universal service to save costs; 
  increase the price for consumers, to increase the affordability of access. 
 
A special market barrier relates to the vertical integration of the EP subcontractor. 
Although paragraph 24 of the postal law states the postal network is an essential 
facility that has to be accessible for other operators at a measured (cost-based) price, 
EP has essential  market power. The competition board and the courts should, if 
necessary, solve these conflicts. Currently, the first case, where EP is debating the 
regulations of the competition board, is under way. According to the regulation, EP 
was  obliged  to  facilitate  access  to  its  network  for  its  single  competitor  Express 
Post.
21 So we see in practice the complete situation. While there is no solution, we 
can  make  our  third  conclusion:  vert ical  integration  has  shown  itself  to  be  an 
intentional  competition  barrier.  Here,  vertical  intertwining  could  be  critically 
examined on the basis of the example of energy and gas supply. 
 
It is not surprising, in that situation, for both sides to be intere sted in a merger. A 
tentative agreement has been reached, and the competition board has been informed 
of plans of a merger. We see here the fourth result of liberalisation: it has led to a re-
monopolization of the postal market. 
 
This will mean a 100% merger between these companies on the markets for press, 
advertisements and letters. In more detail, the merger involves four partial markets 
among which only express services is not threatened by the merger (Table 3).
22 The 
other three will be totally monopoli zed. Damages will be greatest  in the case of 
press mail outs because the two companies in the merger have quite equal positions. 
In the case of the company who already had a dominant position on the market for 
                                                                  
20  http://www.riigikogu.ee/?op=ems&P_APKK=AP&page=apkk_nimekiri&user_id=1071439 
&sort=regnr 
21  http://majandus.delfi.ee/news/uudised/eesti-post-andis-konkurentsiameti-kohtusse.d?id= 
43679271 
22 decision of Competition Board 18.05.2011. no 5.1-5/11-011   304 
advertisements and letters, this position was further strengthened by the merger, and 
the  potential  for  further  competition  was  lost.  It  is  understandable  that  the 
competition board applied all options given by the competition law to process the 
case, but finally, the merger was not allowed.
23 It was the first case that a national 
merger was rejected in Estonia. 
 
Table 3. Market shares of Eesti Post and Express Post 
Company 
Market share 
Eesti Post  Express Post 
Press mail outs  40-60  40-60 
Direct advertisements  90-100  0-10 
Simple letters  90-100  0-10 
Express services  10-20  0-5 
Source: Competition board. 
 
So it is theoretically possible to introduce competition in the Estonian postal sector 
but  in  reality  it  does  not  function.  As  a  result,  the  prices  of  postal  stamps  will 
increase, and access to the postal network will reduce for consumers through the 
closure of postal offices. 
 
Summary 
 
In this article we have evaluated the results of the liberalisation on the postal market 
in  Estonia.  We  have  found  that  all  the  basic  institutions  –  state,  market  and 
enterprises – have been involved in these innovations. These innovations have two 
aims: on the one hand, to increase efficiency through the market and competition, 
and on the other hand, to ensure the provision of a universal service not just for 
private but also for public interests. There is also determined inside the EU a certain 
division  of  functions.  The  EU  is  responsible  for  liberalisation  and  allows  the 
member  states,  through  flanking  measures,  to  realize  the  basic  monitoring  and 
supervision of universal services. 
 
In practice, unfortunately, the reforms have not yet shown any remarkable success. 
Competition has remained modest, especially in the area of the basic supply of US, 
and, the most important attributes of US – geographic and economic access and 
quality of the provision – are threatened through the economic stringency of the US 
supplier. 
 
In particular, in the case of Estonia after the opening up of the market in 2009, we 
have found problematic results: 
  liberalisation has not resulted any essential competition in universal services; 
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  the compensation fund for the universal service obligation under the present 
circumstances is not sustainable, and certainly not efficient; 
  vertical integration has shown itself as an intentional competition barrier; 
  liberalisation has led to the re-monopolization of the postal market. 
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KONKURENTSILE 
 
Jüri Sepp, Raigo Ernits 
Tartu Ülikool 
 
Käesoleva artikli eesmärgiks on hinnata universaalteenuse liberaliseerimise mõjusid 
väikeriigis Eesti postituru näitel. Infrastruktuurisektorite liberaliseerimine on 
viimastel aastakümnetel maailmas populaarsust võitnud suund, mis seisneb eelkõige 
infrastruktuuriteenuse pakkuja monopoli seisundi likvideerimises ja turu avamises 
ning mille eesmärgiks on seeläbi tekkiva konkurentsi kaudu tõsta pakutavate 
teenuste efektiivsust ja kvaliteeti. Samas kaasneb liberaliseerimisega ka oht 
pakutava teenuse mahu ja kvaliteedi languseks ning konkreetse tulemus sõltub 
vastava turu atraktiivsusest ning tasuvusest. Olukorras, kus tegemist on 
universaalteenusega, on teenuse mahu ja kvaliteedi säilimine ning hinnatõusu 
vältimine ka avaliku võimu huviorbiidis. Infrastruktuurisektorite liberaliseerimine 
kuulub ka Euroopa Liidu ametlike eesmärkide hulka, kus see peaks muuhulgas 
kaasa aitama ühisturu ja ühtse majandusruumi kujunemisele.  
 
Eesti seadusandlus defineerib universaalteenust kui üldistes huvides osutatavat ja 
riigi või teatud piirkonna valdava enamiku elanike kasutatavat teenust, milleks on 
gaasi-, elektri-, soojusenergia-, vee- ja kanalisatsiooni-, jäätmekäitlus- ja sideteenus 
ning muu samalaadne teenus. Universaalteenuseid peetakse heaoluriikide tähtsaks 
koostisosaks, mis peaksid võimaldama inimestele täisväärtuslikku majanduslikku ja 
sotsiaalset tegevust mistahes piirkonnas. Nende teenuste liberaliseerimine nõuab 
reeglite kohandamist, tagamaks teenusega kaasnevate sotsiaalsete funktsioonide 
toimimise. Turu avamisega kaasnev konkurentsisurve teenuse pakkujale võib viia 
kulude ja seeläbi pakkumise mahu või kvaliteedi vähendamiseni. Samas ei ole 
avatud turu korral enam õigustatud oodata universaalteenuse kulude katmine senise 
monopolisti poolt läbi ristsubsideerimise ning vajalik on alternatiivsete 
finantseerimismehhanismide rakendamine. Siinkohal pakub teooria välja eelkõige 
järgmised kaks võimalikku lahendusteed: 
1.  Reserveerida kindlaksmääratud regioonide või turusegmentide jaoks 
monopoliõigused, mis võimaldab universaalteenusega kaasnevad 
lisakohustused katta läbi ristsubsideerimise. 
2.  Lisanduvate kulude katmine välisvahendite arvelt, kas otse riigieelarvest või 
läbi spetsiaalselt selleks otstarbeks loodud tasandusfondide. 
 
Esimene tee tagab lihtsa ja stabiilse finantseerimise, kuid nii jäävad kasutamata 
mitmed konkurentsipõhise süsteemi eelised, nagu paranenud efektiivsus ja surve 
innovaatiliste lahenduste otsimisele. Teisalt võib monopoliõiguse kaotamine 
universaalteenuse osutajale aga tähendada negatiivseid finantsilisi mõjusid: 
konkurendid võivad kasumlike teenustega osutamisega turul „koore riisuda“, ilma, 
et nad osaleksid universaalteenuse pakkumisega kaasnevate lisakulude kastmisel. 
Seega paistab, et universaalteenuse säilitamine samaväärsel tasemel, ilma uue 
finantseerimismehhanismita, olema finantsiliselt võimatu. Seda kinnitavad ka 
postiteenuse turu varasemalt liberaliseerinud riikide kogemused. Kindlaksmääratud 
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ta tõstab hinda või kasutab sama võrku mitme erineva teenuse jaoks. Need eelised 
jäävad aga väiksemateks, kui konkurentidele on tagatud juurdepääs samadel 
(mittediskrimineerivatel) tingimustel. 
 
Teine võimalus on vähendada universaalteenuse kvaliteeditaset või vähendada 
pakutava teenuse hulka. Kuna see pole poliitilistel põhjustel sageli vastuvõetav, 
pakuvad teooria ja poliitika võimalike alternatiividena välja rea meetmeid , mida 
riigid võiksid rakendada, tagamaks universaalteenuse pakkumise säilimist vaba turu 
tingimustes. 
 
•  Riigipoolne abi universaalteenuse osutajale läbi subsiidiumite või muude 
finantseerimismehhanismide. Riigipoolse abi kasutamise vastu räägib seeläbi 
tekkiv pikaajaline surve riigieelarvele ning erafirmade kalduvus finantseerida 
selle arvelt läbi ristsubsideerimise ka muid pakutavaid teenuseid. 
 
•  Maksustada ligipääs võrkudele: turuosalised peavad universaalteenuse pakkujale 
maksma tema võrgu kasutamise eest. Alternatiivina võivad turuosalised üles 
ehitada omapoolse võrgu ja pakkuda seeläbi teenust täisahela ulatuses. 
 
•  Tasandusfondid: universaalteenuse kohustusega kaasnevat koormust 
finantseeritakse läbi maksude, mis on kogutud kas konkurentidelt või otse 
klientidelt. Makse võib koguda nii mingi protsendina käibelt, kasumilt või 
fikseeritud summana. Universaalpostiteenuse finantseerimisel on seda meetodit 
rahvusvahelises praktikas kasutatud siiski üsna vähe. 
 
•  „Osale või maksa“-meetod. Turule sisenemisest huvitatud firma saab ise 
otsustada, kas osaleda universaalteenuse pakkumises või teenindada vaid 
kasumlikke valdkondi. Viimase valiku korral tuleb tal aga panustada 
kompensatsioonifondi, mille kaudu kompenseeritakse universaalteenuse 
osutaja(te)le kaasnevad täiendavad kulud. Meetodi rakendamine on võimalik nii 
jäigal kui paindlikul kujul. Paindliku versiooni puhul saab firma ise otsustada, 
millises ulatuses universaalteenuse pakkumises osaleda ning osalemise määrast 
sõltub  ka makse suurus. Kõnealune meetod teeb atraktiivsemaks konkurentsi 
pakkumise ka madalama kasumlikkusega valdkondades. 
 
Euroopas ühtset lahendust välja kujunenud ei ole, kuna igal meetodil on omad 
eelised ja puudused, tulenevalt sellest, kas kriteeriumina kasutada efektiivust, 
konkurentsi tegusust, heaoluvõitude suurust, läbipaistvust või paindlikkust. 
Lisanduvad raskused universaalteenuse täpsete kulude väljaarvutamisel Milline 
lahendus on mingis olukorras parim, sõltub iga riigi ja regiooni spetsiifikast ning 
poliitilistest eesmärkidest. 
 
Euroopa Liidus on alates 1990.aastate algusest aset leidnud postituru järk-järguline 
liberaliseerimine. Esmane initsiatiiv postituru liberaliseerimiseks 1990.aastate 
alguses oli kantud siseturu tugevdamise püüdlustest ning selle eesmärgiks oli avada 
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innoveerida postiteenust sarnaselt senistele arengutele telekommunikatsiooni-  ja 
energiasektoris, ühendada liikmesriikide võimsused ja parandada piiriülese teenuse 
kvaliteeti, vastamaks elektrooniliste alternatiivteenuste kasvule. Vastu võetud 
postiteenuse direktiivid (esimene 1997 ja teine 2002) viisid mitmete postiteenuste, 
nagu pakettide ja ekspressteenuse, turgude avanemiseni. Esialgu ei käinud see 
väikesemahuliste saadetiste kohta. Kindlaksmääratud operaator tohtis selles harus 
edasi tegutseda, kuna mitmetes liikmesriikides kardeti. et liiga kiire liberaliseerimine 
võib kahjustada avalikku operaatorit, vähendada teenuse kvaliteeti ja viia töökohtade 
vähenemiseni. 
 
Kolmandas direktiivis otsustati avada postiturg täielikult 1.jaanuariks 2011 ning 
erandid kuni aastani 2013 lubati vaid uute liikmesriikide, erakordselt keerulise 
topograafia või paljude saartega ning väikese rahvaarvu ja piiratud geograafilise 
suurusega riikidele. Et vältida konkurentsimoonutusi avatud turgudel, keelati 
monopoliseeritud turgudega riikide ettevõtjatel osaleda nende riikide postiteenuse 
pakkumisel, kes oma turu juba täielikult avanud on. Seni viimane direktiiv sätestab 
rea paindlikke meetmeid, millede hulgast liikmesriik võib, tulenevalt oma 
olukorrast, otsustada, kuidas tagada universaalteenuse pakkujale finantsiline tasuvus. 
Siia kuuluvad nii riigipoolne otsene finantsiline abi, ristsubsideerimine kasumlikelt 
teenustelt kahjumlikele kui kompensatsioonifondi loomine läbi turulesisenejate või 
klientide maksustamise. 
 
Postiteenuse liberaliseerimise senised tulemused Euroopas paraku kuigi 
optimismisisendavateks kujunenud ei ole ning konkurentsi iseloomustavad endiselt 
riiklike postiettevõtete (endiste seadustatud monopolide) domineerimine, olulised 
sisenemisbarjäärid ning konkurentide väike arv. 
 
Eesti avas oma postituru, viienda riigina Euroopas, täielikult aprillis 2009, mil 
loobuti tavakirjadele monopoli reserveerimisest. Tavakirjade turg moodustas tol ajal 
75% Eesti postiturust ning seni toimis seal monopolina riigiettevõte Eesti Post. 
Teoreetiliselt oli küll võimalik selles harus konkureerida ka varem, kuid reaalselt 
võis rääkida välistavatest takistustest. Poliitiliselt defineeritud universaalteenuse alla 
kuuluvad Eestis traditsiooniliselt kuni 2 kg kaaluvad kirjad ja postipakid kuni 20 kg. 
Kvaliteedikriteeriumi kohaselt peavad 90% kirjadest olema kohale toimetatud 
hiljemalt järgmiseks päevaks ning geograafilise ligipääsetavuse osas peab igas 
omavalitsuses olema postiameti üksus, lisaks veel täiendav üksus iga 20 000 inimese 
kohta. Riigi poolt on kehtestatud on ka ülempiirid universaalteenuste hindadele. 
 
Varasem monopolist Eesti Post on jäänud seni postiturul domineerivaks, olles 
mõnevõrra vähendanud juurdepääsu universaalteenusele (postkontorite arv on 
vähenenud 407-lt 351-le. Eesti Post on suutnud kasumlikult majandada peamiselt 
tänu laiale tootevalikule ning kasumit on toonud seejuures peamiselt erinevad 
kõrvaltegevused: mitmesugused: logistika- ja finantsteenused. 
 
Kokku tegutses Eestis postiturul 2010. aastal küll 33 ettevõtet, kuid 
universaalteenuse pakkumise osas oli vaid üks konkureeriv ettevõte (AS Express 
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kaks konkurenti. Ka postiteenuste osutajate koguarv muude teenuste osas on peale 
turu avamise järgset esialgset kasvu jällegi mõnevõrra vähenenud. Seega võime 
järeldada, et liberaliseerimine ei ole Eestis universaalteenuse osutamisel olulist 
konkurentsi kaasa toonud. Põhjuseks võib siin ühelt poolt muidugi olla ka 
elektroonilise kommunikatsiooni võidukäik, kuid teisalt kindlasti ka 
universaalteenuse pakkumisega kaasnevate lisakulude finantseerimise mudel, mis 
eeldab ettevõtetelt, kes soovivad universaalteenuse pakkumise osas Eesti Postiga 
konkureerida, litsenseerimisega kaasnevat maksekohustust kompensatsioonifondi. 
Muude postiteenuste, nagu ekspressteenus, reklaami-  või ajakirjandusväljaannete 
postitamine, pakkujatel sellist kohustust ei ole. Kuivõrd universaalteenuse osas on 
Eesti Posti konkurentide turuosa alla 10%, ei ole mõeldav universaalteenuse 
osutamisega Eesti Postile kaasnevate lisakulude täilik katmine konkurentide poolt. 
Siit jõuame artikli teise järelduseni: kompensatsioonifond tänastes tingimustes ei ole 
jätkusuutlik ega isegi mitte toimiv mehhanism universaalteenusega kaasnevate 
lisakulude finantseerimiseks. Lahendustena võib siin välja pakkuda otseseid toetusi 
riigieelarvest, universaalteenuse kvaliteedi ja ligipääsuvõimaluste langetamist 
tarbijate jaoks või universaalteenuse hinna tõstmist. 
 
Eesti Posti positsiooniga turul on seotud veel üks spetsiaalne takistus tegusa 
konkurentsi tekkeks postiturul. Kuigi postiseadus kohustab konkurentidele 
võimaldama mõistliku (kulupõhise) hinnaga juurdepääsu postivõrgule kui olulise 
vahendile, on Eesti Postil siin oluline turuvõim ja lahenduse leidmiseks on käimas 
kohtuprotsess Eesti Posti ja konkurentsiameti vahel. Siit tuleneb artikli kolmas 
järeldus: vertikaalne integratsioon toimib sihiliku konkurentsipiiranguna. Probleemi 
lahendusena võiks siin pakkuda vertikaalset desintegratsiooni energia-  ja 
gaasimajanduse eeskujul. 
 
On mõistetav, et kujunenud olukorras on nii Eesti Post kui tema ainus konkurent 
universaalteenuse pakkumise osas huvitatud ühinemisest. Selleks on juba esitatud ka 
konkurentsiametile vastav taotlus. Siit tuleneb artikli neljas järeldus: postituru 
liberaliseerimine on viinud turu remonopoliseerumiseni. Kõnealune ühinemine 
tähendaks pea sajaprotsendise turuosaga ettevõtte teket ajakirjandus-  ja 
reklaamitoodete turul ning tavakirjade kättetoimetamise turul, tuues 
konkurentsipotentsiaali kaotsimineku näol enim kahju ajakirjandustoodete 
kättetoimetamise turul, kus ühinemissooviga ettevõtted seni pea võrdset turuosa 
omavad. Vaid ekspressteenuste turul ei kaasneks kavandatava ühinemisega tarbija 
jaoks olulist kahju. 
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